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CAN THE CHURCH BE A VIRTUOUS 
HEARER OF WOMEN?
Mary Carlson
In 1972, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops attempted 
to address concerns raised by Vatican II regarding the treatment 
of women in the Church. The plan was to produce a pastoral letter 
on “The Role of Women in Society and the Church.” Twenty-two 
years, hundreds of revised pages, and four drafts later, it pro-
duced a disappointing fourteen-page pamphlet, Strengthening 
the Bonds of Peace. Using this pastoral as a case study, Carlson 
asks, can the Church be a virtuous hearer of women? The ques-
tion is meant to determine if there is an injustice being done 
and stems from the virtue ethics theory of Miranda Fricker. If 
there is no injustice, then we must look at the issue in a new way. 
However, if an injustice is being done, Carlson proposes a way to 
reapproach women through the hermeneutic of lived experience 
using Fricker’s remedy of virtuous hearing. 
In 1972, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), still caught 
up in the idealism of Vatican II, tried to address concerns the council raised 
regarding the treatment of women in the Church. The plan was to dialogue, 
study, pray, and consult with Catholic clergy, theologians, and women from all 
walks of life and to produce a pastoral letter on “The Role of Women in Society 
and the Church.” Twenty-two years, hundreds of revised pages, and four drafts 
later, NCCB sent to parishes a disappointing fourteen-page pamphlet entitled 
Strengthening the Bonds of Peace.1 
1 National Council of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), US Catholic Conference Committee on 
Women in Society and in the Church, Strengthening the Bonds of Peace (Washington, DC: USCC 
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While others, such as Lisa Sowle Cahill and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza,2 
have addressed the rightful role of women in the Church through the herme-
neutical lenses of early Church tradition/teaching, scriptural studies, and rea-
son/natural law, this paper addresses women’s role through a fourth pillar of 
Christian ethical refl ection–lived experience. Using the history of the writing of 
the pastoral letter on women as a case in point,3 the particular question raised 
here is: assuming that the Church desires to act virtuously, does the Church 
hierarchy practice virtuous hearing with women? The question is meant to 
determine if there is an injustice being done and is rooted in Miranda Fricker’s 
virtue ethics theory.4 If there is no injustice, then we must look at the issue 
in a new way. However, if an injustice is being done, would it be possible to 
apply Fricker’s proposed remedy of virtuous hearing within a framework that 
has precedent in Church history? If so, it may give the Church hierarchy a way 
to reapproach women (and possibly other marginalized groups) through the 
hermeneutic of lived experience. 
The fi rst part of this paper examines the question of the Church’s possible 
justice or injustice toward women, using a brief history of the American bishops’ 
attempt to produce a pastoral letter on women as a case study (based largely 
on Marvin Mich’s work,5 physical copies of the documents when available, and 
drafts of the pastoral published in the Catholic News Service’s Documentary 
Service Origins). The second part briefl y explains elements of Fricker’s the-
ory regarding testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.  The  third part notes 
some ideas of how the Church, in the interest of justice and the common good, 
might begin to validate women’s lived experience and includes an applica-
tion of Fricker’s theory of virtuous hearing, which may be worthy of further 
investigation.
Inc., 1994). The only hint that this pamphlet addressed women’s concerns was that the cover 
depicted women.
2 See, for example, Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Natural Law, a Feminist Reassessment,” in Is There 
a Human Nature? ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 
78–91. Also see Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “Word, Spirit, and Power: Women in Early Christian 
Communities,” in Women of Spirit: Female Leadership in the Jewish and Christian Traditions, ed. 
Rosemary Ruether and Eleanor McLaughlin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 72–99.
3 NCCB, Strengthening the Bonds of Peace. 
4 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
5 Marvin L. Krier Mich, “Sexism: Women’s Voices Silent No Longer,” in Catholic Social 
Teaching and Movements (Mystic, CT: Twenty-Third Publications, 1998), 347–84.
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A Brief History of the NCCB’s Attempted Pastoral Letter 
on Women in Church and Society
While more than a brief summary of the twenty-two year process and the 
contents of the drafts is beyond the scope of this paper, some relevant highlights 
follow. Mich begins his account of the history of the pastoral quoting Donal 
Dorr, refl ecting upon one hundred years of Catholic social teaching, as saying 
that perhaps the biggest lacuna in the Church’s social teaching is its failure to 
provide an adequate treatment of the issue of justice for women.6
In 1972, the NCCB (later called the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, 
or USCCB, used here interchangeably) formed an ad hoc committee charged 
with addressing women’s concerns and then recommending actions. With 
input from a wide variety of women, they developed a survey, which they 
conducted in 1977. In 1982, the committee recommended that the NCCB 
formally address the concerns women raised, and in 1984, listening sessions 
were held around the country, eventually involving 75,000 women from one 
hundred dioceses, sixty college campuses, and forty-fi ve military bases. The 
committee charged with writing a “pastoral document” was made up of six 
bishops and seven women (mostly from academia, but representing women 
who were single, married, vowed religious, and mothers). The intention to 
enter into dialogue honestly with women from all walks of life (along with 
questions anticipating elements of testimonial and hermeneutical justice/
injustice) seems refl ected in the questions asked:7
1. As you refl ect upon your experience as a Catholic woman, what 
stands out for you?
2. In what ways do you feel appreciated as a woman in the Church? 
In society?
3. In what ways do you feel oppressed/discriminated against in the 
Church? In society?
4. As you refl ect upon your personal experiences, what do you fi nd 
contributes most to the reconciliation (harmony, affi rmation, 
dignity, healing) of women in the Church? In society?
5. As you refl ect upon your personal experiences, what do you 
fi nd contributed the most to the alienation (abuse, divisiveness, 
dehumanization) of women in the Church? In society?
6 Ibid., 247.
7 NCCB, Ad Hoc Committee, Partners in the Mystery of Redemption: A Pastoral Response to 
Women’s Concerns for Church and Society (Washington, DC: US Catholic Conference, 1988), 87. 
I have edited the questions slightly for length. 
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6. As you refl ect upon your personal experiences, what issues/
themes emerge as the most important for development of the 
bishops’ pastoral letter on women in the Church and society?
Since women are not a monolithic entity, upon publication, their response 
was not universal.8 However, while some women offered support for traditional 
Church teaching, more asked the Church to address perceived discrimination 
within the Church, and beyond that, to offer contrition. In 1988, the NCCB 
issued its fi rst draft, Partners in the Mystery of Redemption: A Pastoral Response 
to Women’s Concerns for Church and Society, a ninety-nine page document.9 
Partners in the Mystery of Redemption contained a report of what the com-
mittee heard through its extensive listening process, a refl ection of Catholic 
thought, and a response intended to seek remedies to injustices and to pro-
mote positive values advocated by women. The four headings in the document 
refl ected concerns of women: as persons, in relationships, in society, and in 
the Church. That draft was the last to quote directly from and to be genuinely 
refl ective of women’s actual voices. 
The second draft of the letter, written in 1990, One in Christ Jesus: A 
Pastoral Response to the Concerns of Women in Church and Society,10 was not 
put to a vote by the NCCB, due to an international episcopal consultation that 
the Vatican called for. The third draft was written in response to what the Vatican 
called “implications for the Church universal.” Called to Be One in Christ Jesus 
was presented to the entire body of bishops and returned to committee again 
after their input.11 The fourth version (One in Christ Jesus) was fi nally put to 
a vote.12 The bishops voted 137 to 110 in favor of publishing the draft, but, 
because it required a two-thirds majority to publish, it failed.13
A number of differences are evident between the fi rst and fourth drafts, 
only a few of which there is space to comment on here. One striking difference, 
however, is that women’s voices can scarcely be heard in the fourth draft—all 
direct quotes from women in the fi rst draft were eliminated from One in Christ 
Jesus.14 The fi rst draft had called for more study of the ministerial priesthood, 
while upholding current practice (largely on the basis of unbroken tradition) 
and called for expediting the study of admitting women to the diaconate. The 
8 While I can try to hear and internalize the categorical experience of others, and to hear 
them virtuously, I can only write from my own schema. I have found allusion to but no data that sep-
arates out the concerns about or responses to this document from women of various socioeconomic 
statuses, LGBT status, abilities/disabilities, or racial/ethnic groups. 
9 NCCB, Partners in the Mystery of Redemption.
10 Origins 19 (April 25, 1990): 717, 719–40. 
11 Origins 21 (April 23, 1992): 761, 763–76.
12 NCCB, One in Christ Jesus (Washington, DC: US Catholic Conference, 1992).
13 Patrick Carey Pastoral Letters and Statements of the United States Catholic Bishops, vol. 6, 
1989–1997 (Washington, DC: US Catholic Conference, 1998).
14 NCCB, One in Christ Jesus. 
This content downloaded from 134.48.158.106 on Mon, 12 Dec 2016 20:23:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Carlson: Can the Church Be a Virtuous Hearer of Women? 25
committee pointed out that women were already performing most of the func-
tions of the diaconate through lay ministry and were “capable of accomplishing 
all of them.”15 The fourth draft, while still calling for the study of the possibil-
ity of the diaconate for women, reaffi rmed the Church’s teaching on the male 
priesthood. One strong argument used in the fourth draft was that the priest 
was the sacramental sign of Christ and relied on “the natural symbol of gender.” 
This switch from using tradition as the main argument to a greater reliance 
on analogy was also evident in the area of inclusive language. While the fi rst 
draft calls for inclusive language in liturgical and educational settings “when-
ever possible,”16 the fourth draft, while recognizing the need to specifi cally 
change terms such as men and brothers to more inclusive words, encourages 
caution, rejecting the “ideological overtones” surrounding the issue: “Especially 
we must recognize the normative nature of Christ’s revelation to us that God 
is our Father and hence preserve the Trinitarian names. Such language is not 
merely metaphorical. It is analogical, that is, it expresses, albeit in an imperfect 
and limited way, the truth of the life of the Trinity.”17
In summarizing the fi nal, fourteen-page version of the pastoral (which was 
delivered to parishes in pamphlet form), the way the documents begin and 
end seems symbolic. The fi rst draft begins with an account of the “Samaritan 
Woman” (John 4:39) as an example of women being among the fi rst (if not 
the fi rst) witnesses to Jesus’s proclamation of the Kingdom of Heaven and the 
Resurrection.18 The committee then transparently  recounts its  membership, 
its charge from Vatican II, and the process through which the fi rst draft was 
written. Partners closes with the call for implementation of its recommenda-
tions (rather than  “empty words”), and the charge, “Thus, having heard the 
word, we must respond with imagination and courage to eradicate the injustice 
which keeps us from the full stature of Christ.” It ends with Mary’s proclamation 
of the Magnifi cat (Luke 1:46–55), which may be seen as a call to justice and 
to the overthrow of oppressive social order. The third draft (1992) begins with 
a truncated version of the fi rst drafts, and includes the caveat that the bishops 
were now responding as the “authentic teachers of faith,” not using consul-
tants from the social sciences as they had in the pastorals on war and the econ-
omy: “We did not respond as empirical scientists following a rigorous method 
leading to scientifi c conclusions. Nor did we attempt with scientifi c accuracy to 
clarify all the issues and the causes of the concerns women raise.”19
The fourth draft of the pastoral ends with the reiteration of the bishops’ 
roles as teachers and ministers and their responsibility to make known the 
15 NCCB, Partners in the Mystery of Redemption, 75.
16 Ibid., 78.
17 NCCB, One in Christ Jesus, 26.
18 NCCB, Partners in the Mystery of Redemption, 1.
19 NCCB, One in Christ Jesus, 1.
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wisdom of sacred scripture and the Church’s tradition, which will “serve to 
strengthen our communion with one another in Christ Jesus.”20 Hence, that the 
fi fth and fi nal document (Strengthening the Bonds of Peace, 1994), begins the 
fi rst paragraph by reiterating what women are not allowed to do (summarizing 
and affi rming the teaching and practice that ordination is reserved for men) 
should come as no surprise.21 
The NCCB added their affi rmation of Pope John Paul II’s praise of wom-
en’s “necessary and irreplaceable” role in the Church. The pamphlet denounces 
discrimination and espouses equality but more strongly emphasizes the “diver-
sity of gifts” offered by females and males. The second paragraph on the fi rst 
page encourages our “brothers and sisters” (even this address indicates how 
tone-deaf the pamphlet is, by addressing it to “brothers” before the “sisters” 
whose issues it addresses) to accept and understand more fully the Ordinatio 
Sacerdoctales, the offi cial teaching on the all-male priesthood. Acknowledging 
that the teaching had started a fi restorm in some quarters, the bishops wrote, 
“some received the teaching with joy and peace. Others found acceptance 
diffi cult.” The bishops continued, extending the invitation to strengthen the 
bonds of peace, “For certainly, all can agree that peace is a blessing we long 
for.”22 There is little doubt that the bishops longed for peace and that they envi-
sioned that peace coming through women’s acceptance of the teaching in a 
“peaceful” manner. 
It is instructive that the directions for use and accompanying materials 
for the pamphlet were roughly three times the length of the pamphlet itself 
(forty-eight pages).23 Among the resources is advice that homilists should 
address the topics of women’s equal dignity in ministry and family life through-
out the liturgical year; “but, proceed with caution. Remember that the idea 
of women as partners with men is still new to many, and not always easily 
received.”24 The bishops insist that dialogue is essential (although forbidden on 
the topic of women’s ordination) and an instrument of peacemaking. “We can 
use dialogue to approach complicated, confusing, and often polarizing issues 
such as the topic of women . . . in the Catholic Church.”25 The bishops add, “the 
presence of opposing ideas is actually healthy.”26 Hence, women’s voices may be 
“heard” but only on certain topics. The section ends with signs of “progress,” 
a survey of the many roles women were able to perform in the Church at that 
20 Ibid., 26.
21 NCCB, Strengthening the Bonds. 
22 Ibid., 1. 
23 NCCB, Strengthening the Bonds of Peace, Resource Packet (Washington, DC: US Catholic 
Conference, 1994).
24 Ibid., Section 3, 1.
25 Ibid., Section 6, 1.
26 Ibid., Section 6, 7.
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time. Unsurprising to anyone who visits a parish offi ce or attends Sunday mass 
was the report that 85 percent of parish ministers were women.27 
In a collapsed version of history, suffi ce to say that each draft was further 
removed, both literally and fi guratively, from the hands of women, culminating 
in the fi nal pamphlet being written by two (male) bishops.28 Each of the sub-
sequent drafts was more refl ective of the criticism, by some bishops but most 
strongly the Vatican, that the role of the bishops to teach had been abdicated 
and that the active listening posture, which had been adopted in the early days 
of the ad hoc committee, did not refl ect the bishops’ proprietary teaching role.29 
Fricker’s Theory of Testimonial and 
Hermeneutical Injustice
In examining whether an injustice was committed through the lens of vir-
tue ethics, a defi nition of terms is in order. Virtue ethics, as understood here,30 
means a form of normative ethics that emphasizes the development of virtues, 
particularly prudence, in an attempt to discern what attitudes and actions will 
bring about human fl ourishing and the common good. Both human fl ourishing 
and the common good are the result of just actions determined by right reason. 
Both just actions and right reason must take into account lived experience, as 
Fricker’s theory does. I make the assumption here that Fricker’s ethical theory, 
although secular, is compatible with the Church’s long embrace of Thomistic/
Aristotelian teaching on virtue and ethics. This case will be centered on the 
cardinal virtues of prudence (perhaps more readily understandable in another 
common translation, practical wisdom) and justice.31 
Fricker’s theory, as outlined in her book, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the 
Ethics of Knowing, was a philosophical response to the infl uence of positivist 
linguistic analysis.32 She and other critics felt that particular philosophy lacked 
27 Ibid., Section 6, 10. 
28 Mich, “Sexism,” 262.
29 Ibid.
30 Space limitations preclude me from anything but a brief defi nition of virtue ethics here. 
Aside from Fricker’s treatment in Epistemic Injustice, writings on virtue ethics abound, beginning 
with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics through Aquinas’s Summa Theologica to current books, includ-
ing Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Virtue Ethics (Oxford Readings in Philosophy) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).
31 A description of the Church’s long embrace of virtue ethics, again, is beyond the scope of 
this paper. For one source of the appropriateness of applying virtue ethics to the actions of the 
bishops, see the 1993 Catechism of the Catholic Church (http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015
/_INDEX.HTM), Article 7, which includes defi nitions of just, prudent, and virtuous behaviors. The 
tradition of Christian theological ethicists continues today with Catholic moral theologians such as 
Margaret Farley, James Keenan, and Bryan Massingale.
32 For an extensive discussion of positivist linguistic analysis (also called logical positivism), 
which rejects metaphysics and has an empirical basis, and its relationship to other philosophical 
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agential responsibility for injustice and neglected the study of ethics. Her the-
ory aimed to make epistemology more relevant to current experience. Fricker 
says, “epistemology is gradually being broadened . . . to cultivate a closer rela-
tionship to actual epistemic practices . . . when we take our primary subject mat-
ter to be those human practices through which knowledge is gained, or indeed 
lost.”33 So, while not directly tied to theology, her work is applicable in terms 
of how knowledge is shared, understood, built, and conveyed. Since one of the 
foci of Catholic theological ethics is experience, her focus on the injustices in 
socially situated, lived experience would include the Church as a place where 
the study of ecclesial knowledge (or ecclesial epistemology) would occur. 
Culpability for some of Fricker’s injustice is largely agential (meaning that 
the injustice is committed by one person to another34) as is the case in testimo-
nial injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs when one person disbelieves another 
because “prejudice causes a hearer to give a defl ated level of credibility to a 
speaker’s word.”35 So, one person might disbelieve another due to differences 
in gender/sexuality, race/ethnicity, social class, or other conceptual divisions of 
humanity that make one person feel another is inferior. 
Other injustices are largely structural, in which society as a whole (or a 
representative or segment of that society in power) commits the injustice. In 
hermeneutical injustice, people are disbelieved because,  “a gap in collective 
interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to 
making sense of their social experiences.”36 In other words, this sort of injustice 
occurs when, usually due to closely held power structures (such as the Church’s 
hierarchy), there is a lack of input from marginalized groups, so that nei-
ther group has language to serve as a basis for belief in, or understanding of, the 
experiences of the marginalized group. We are all epistemologically blocked.
Simply stated, Fricker’s injustice occurs whenever prejudice on the hearer’s 
part, caused by the hearer’s stereotypic judgment of the speaker or “knower” 
in Fricker’s terminology, causes the hearer to give the knower less credibility. 
Therefore, the knower is not “heard,” resulting in the primary harm of unjustly 
being disbelieved and thus being devalued as a person. Secondary harm occurs 
both in whatever the practical, immediate consequences of being disbelieved, 
discredited, or disregarded might be and also epistemologically, in being pre-
maturely removed from further dialogue or access to the capacity to know. To 
be clear, in Fricker’s terminology, the “hearer” is the person(s) listening to and 
movements, see A. J. Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random House/
Vintage, 1984).
33 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, vii.
34 While there is some philosophical debate about structures acting as agents, I use Fricker’s 
individual meaning here.
35 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 1.
36 Ibid.
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judging the speaker. In this particular case, the “hearer” refers to the Church 
hierarchy. The “knower” is the expert witness, or the person who speaks from 
their own lived experience—in this case, the “knowers” are Catholic women.
Fricker uses the example of the trial in To Kill a Mockingbird by Harper 
Lee to explain testimonial injustice.37 In that trial, a black man, Tom Robinson, 
is wrongly accused and convicted of the sexual assault of a white woman, in spite 
of the facts presented, which proved that Tom could not have committed the 
crime. So, despite physical evidence to the contrary, because Tom was black, 
the white jurors who heard his testimony judged him to be either incredible or 
untrustworthy and found him guilty of a crime he did not commit. The primary 
harm done was that he was not “heard” as any human being should be. The 
secondary harm in this case was much greater—he was murdered by vigilantes 
before he could appeal his sentence. 
As another example, when my son-in-law brought his baby to the doctor 
because he was concerned about an unusual rash, a white pediatrician, who 
was not the baby’s regular doctor, explained to him that it was important to 
change a baby’s diaper frequently to avoid diaper rash. My son-in-law (who 
has many tattoos and is Puerto Rican) patiently explained that he was a stay-at-
home parent, that this was his second child, and that he had managed to avoid 
any serious rashes through the baby’s fi rst year. The pediatrician remained 
skeptical—my son-in-law was less credible in her opinion than a stay-at-home 
mom would be—or perhaps less credible because of his tattoos or ethnicity. 
The primary harm was that he was doubted as a competent parent. The sec-
ondary harm, had he not come back the next day to see the regular pediatrician 
and gotten a prescription for the rash, would have been more pain and discom-
fort for the baby. 
To illustrate hermeneutical injustice, in which society as a whole is dis-
criminatory toward marginalized groups, Fricker uses the experience of sexual 
harassment. Prior to the mid- to late twentieth century, men in Europe and 
America held power closely, with limited input from women in the realms of 
academia, law, religion, and politics. Because there were few women in the 
power structure, they were hermeneutically marginalized, unable to participate 
equally in the practices through which social meanings were generated and 
shared. Because men were only familiar with what we now call sexual harass-
ment from their own point of view, it was inadequately conceptualized in society 
and therefore unable to be really shared and understood. In addition, because 
of prevailing attitudes of guilt and shame, women did not readily discuss the 
harassment, further hampering the concept development. The harm done to 
many women, beyond being disbelieved or misunderstood, was both physical 
and psychological. It was not until consciousness-raising groups were initiated 
37 Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1960).
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during the women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s that women began to 
discuss and to name this phenomenon.38
In addition, though generally unnoticed, in the case of hermeneutical injus-
tice, not only is there situated hermeneutical inequality (in which members 
of the marginalized group are unfairly disadvantaged in rendering themselves 
intelligible) but there is also harm done to the hearer. The hearer, who is part of 
the dominant group, also suffers from hermeneutical lacuna and cognitive dis-
ablement, or the inability to understand certain concepts that we have no words 
for. This paper discusses the application of virtue ethics to this idea (in a phil-
osophical sense) and the harm to full communion (in a theological sense) later. 
For now, suffi ce it to say that in hermeneutical injustice, prudence is lacking, 
experience is disbelieved, common good is thwarted, truth is not understood, 
and justice is not served. With that as the context of testimonial and hermeneu-
tical injustice, I apply Fricker’s theory to examine the case in point, the history 
of the creation of the pastoral letter on women’s role in the Church. 
Application of Fricker’s Theory to the 
NCCB’s Pastoral on Women
In hindsight, it is clear where the pastoral went awry. In his encyclical Mater 
et Magistra, (St.) Pope John XXIII, building on the work of Joseph Cardijn, 
advocated the look, judge, act model (based upon the virtue of prudence, right 
reason applied to action, according to Aquinas), as a way for the Church to 
undertake the social action called for by the Council.39 The fi rst step of pru-
dence is to look, taking good counsel through inquiry. In our case, this was 
justly undertaken by the original NCCB ad hoc committee, as demonstrated by 
the questions they asked women and the broad net they cast for their survey. 
The second step is to judge what you have discovered in your inquiry. Again, 
this appears to have been done justly through the long process of listening and 
producing the fi rst draft of the letter, which was faithful to the lived experience 
of the women surveyed. The third step is to act upon what you have found and 
38 One might have some confusion here on the difference between testimonial and herme-
neutical injustice in the case of Tom Robinson. Certainly, while structural prejudices infl uenced 
the jury, Tom knew and understood that he was not guilty, as did members of the jury. There was 
language developed that all parties could understand—it was simply overridden by prejudice. If the 
injustice were hermeneutical, Tom would not just be disbelieved, but he would be unable to ade-
quately express or perhaps even understand what had happened. Tom both knew and understood 
what had happened, as did many members of the white community.
39 Mater et Magistra: Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on Christianity and Social Progress, 
May 15, 1961, #236, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc
_15051961_mater.html; Joseph Cardijn, “See, Judge, Act—Fifty Years of Catholic Social Practice,” 
http://www.cardijn.info/2011/05/see-judge-act-fi fty-years-of-catholic.html ; and Bernard V. Brady, 
Essential Catholic Social Thought (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2008). 
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judged—and this is where it appears injustice occurred. Recall that at the end 
of the fi rst draft, the ad hoc committee called for actions, among which were: 
changing some aspects of Church language; seriously studying and discussing 
the all-male priesthood and diaconate; offering contrition for past sins against 
women; and taking on, in Margaret Farley’s words, an “attitude of epistemic 
humility” (the realization that no one is omniscient) when listening to women.40 
Sadly, most of these actions were never undertaken—and some that were, such 
as substitution of inclusive language in the liturgy, have reverted to where they 
were before the fi rst draft.
If the ends of virtuous conduct are the common good and human fl ourish-
ing, the fi rst step in applying Fricker’s theory of testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustice to the pastoral on women would be to recognize that the fl ourishing 
of all is diminished by the exclusion of any. Aside from the women who were 
and are harmed by the actions of the bishops (in being denied their credibil-
ity as knowers), those in power are also excluded from the fullest grace of the 
Catholic communion by their failure to understand the language of marginal-
ized groups.41 While Fricker depends upon philosophical models of the com-
mon good such as Aristotle’s, in which the fl ourishing of the community and 
the fl ourishing of individuals are deeply connected, our Catholic tradition of 
Eucharist makes our mutual dependence even more clear—we are joined, body 
and soul, with Christ and one another, so the diminishment of any is injuri-
ous to all. In this case, it appears that somewhere between the fi rst and fourth 
drafts, testimonial injustice occurred when some bishop(s) and/or curial offi -
cial(s) denied the validity of the fourth pillar of Christian ethical refl ection, lived 
experience. We don’t have a name to go with the agent or agents who made this 
decision, but we do know that the words of women were both literally and fi g-
uratively erased from later drafts, deemed not credible enough and/or sincere 
enough to hold truth. At that same stage, women were removed from the hear-
ing process. Thus, hermeneutical injustice occurred also, because those with 
teaching authority are the ones who have structured our collective ecclesial 
understanding, and that ecclesial understanding seemed to be the barrier that 
women could not (and the bishops would not) breech. 
Fricker acknowledges that many virtues are historically contingent, and 
therein lies the question of culpability. The degree of culpability is determined 
40 Margaret A. Farley “Ethics, Ecclesiology, and the Grace of Self-Doubt,” in A Call to 
Fidelity: On the Moral Theology of Charles E. Curran, ed. James J. Walter, Timothy E. O’Connell, 
and Thomas A. Shannon (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 55–75. Farley says 
that theologians must look not only to tradition, Scripture, reason, and their own experiences but 
to the historical, social, cultural, and spiritual experiences of all the faithful. She urges the leaders 
of the Church to listen with “epistemic humility” thus “enabling the voices of its members” (60).
41 When we say that the groups do not understand one another’s language, it is not the failure 
to understand the words but the inability or failure to accept the experience conveyed by the words 
as worthy or valid. 
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by what a reasonable person of the period, practicing prudence or practical 
wisdom, should have known. Thus, in the case of the bishop’s letter, there is cul-
pability on the part of the Church hierarchy in that the initial ad hoc committee 
acted as virtuous hearers in giving credence to women’s experience by listen-
ing justly, prudently, and charitably. So, we could have reasonably expected the 
Vatican hierarchy and the larger group of American bishops to act in the same 
way. The questions asked of women before the fi rst draft allowed for a correc-
tion of historical biases, not just by bringing in women as knowers, but also by 
having women as partners, along with the historically male hierarchy, among 
those who were the hearers. Fricker describes the effect of historical biases: 
“Let us say that when there is unequal hermeneutical participation with respect 
to some signifi cant area(s) of social experience, members of the disadvantaged 
group are hermeneutically marginalized. The notion of marginalization is a 
moral-political one indicating subordination and exclusion from some practice 
that would have value for the participant.”42 
This may lead to cognitive disablement (an inability to understand or learn 
in a particular area) of the knower and the hearer. This occurs both because 
the Church may lack a recognition of an experience (such as being a woman) 
and because all may lack the language or communicative tools to describe the 
experience. Also, being part of that marginalized group may lead to the stunting 
of ecclesial development, and due to this gap in understanding and the fail-
ure of the dominant Vatican curial culture to remove obstacles and/or build 
bridges, do epistemological harm to both groups. Thus, women are prevented 
from having any offi cial standing to articulate their experience. Not only that 
but they are also removed from both the ecclesial conversation and from the 
inner circles in which they might become hearers, and so they remain unable to 
join the dialogue and gain standing. Therefore, the whole Church is prevented 
from fl ourishing, and a remedy is called for. Others in the Church have and 
should propose other solutions: I propose one remedy, virtuous hearing, from 
Fricker’s model. 
Applying Fricker’s Virtuous Hearing with a 
Catholic Sensibility
In looking toward a remedy, I take inspiration from Christian liberation 
theologies, centered on the dignity of the human person, in which marginalized 
groups seek their rightful place at the table. Bernard Brady writes that when 
we look at approaches to questions of social justice, we often ask, “Ought we 
work to change systems, structures and laws? Or ought we work to change peo-
ple’s hearts and minds?”43 To Brady, it is not an either/or, but a both/and. He 
42 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 151 (emphasis added).
43 Brady, Essential Catholic Social Thought, 179.
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addresses the universal good that liberation theologies can bring to the Church, 
using language that can help us understand how, as Fricker says, “two streams 
of input—collective and individual—continually generate a person’s moral 
sensibility”44 
It is no small feat to overcome testimonial and, especially, hermeneuti-
cal injustice. Canadian theologian Bernard Lonergan  speaks about the diffi -
culty in overcoming our collective blind spots. Much like the danger posed 
to a researcher in a single blind study,  the uncritical, biased mind sees only 
evidence that confi rms its own thinking and beliefs. Lonergan asks, “How is a 
mind to become conscious of its own bias when that bias springs from a com-
munal fl ight from understanding and is supported by the whole texture of a 
civilization?”45 
In order to bring about testimonial justice through virtuous hearing, we 
must realize that “in testimonial exchanges, for hearers and speakers alike, no 
party is neutral; everybody has a race, everybody has a gender.  .  .  . What is 
needed . . . is a corrective anti-prejudicial virtue that is distinctively refl exive 
in structure.”46 For those who may be part of a hierarchical structure, Fricker 
warns of the strong role that social identity  plays.47 “The virtuous hearer, 
then, must be refl exively aware of how the relation between his social identity 
and that of the speaker is impacting on the intelligibility to him of what she is 
saying and how she is saying it.”48 
A prerequisite to fi ghting hermeneutical injustice is being aware of our own 
identity, and the unconscious rights, privileges, stereotypes, and psychosocial 
baggage that accompany that identity. While testimonial justice can become 
refl exive practice, applied to particular subjects, or knowers, hermeneutical 
injustice must be developed objectively. Fricker says that we need to learn to 
allow for the possibility that, due to the real, lived experience of another, there 
might be more than one valid interpretation of truth. This is not the same as 
pluralism—it merely acknowledges that we have only seen the world through 
our own eyes. We must go out of our way, above and beyond, to ask if “what 
the speaker is struggling to articulate would make good sense if the attempt to 
articulate it were being made in a more inclusive hermeneutical climate—one 
without structural identity prejudice. . . . The guiding ideal is that the degree of 
credibility is adjusted upwards to compensate for the cognitive and expressive 
44 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 82.
45 Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli, eds., The Lonergan Reader (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1997), 39.
46 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 91. 
47 In Racial Justice and the Catholic Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2010), Bryan Massingale 
says of the “unconscious” nature of a cultural stereotype that its acquisition may not be explicit: “It 
is learned, internalized and used without an awareness of its source” (28). 
48 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 168.
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handicap imposed on the hermeneutically marginalized.”49 This must be done 
consciously, at fi rst, but, if practiced over time, our sensibility can be recondi-
tioned, through suffi cient corrective experience, to become habitual. Might one 
who practices Farley’s epistemic humility, allowing the voices of others to have 
credence, be on the path to virtuous hearing? How could individual members 
of the Church, bishops, and the collective of the magisterium begin this diffi cult 
task? Each of us needs to cultivate, through both experience and right thinking 
achieved through prudence, an openness to become moral and ethical people 
who try to correct for society’s identity prejudices.50 
Fricker says that virtuous hearing can be acquired, like all virtuous behavior, 
through a purposeful habituation of giving the other the benefi t of the doubt. 
If what the knower says makes good sense and seems to be a truthful account 
(we should even risk overcompensating toward this end), we should make every 
attempt to believe her/him. “A refl ective, critical social awareness . . . is a cor-
rective anti-prejudicial virtue that is distinctively refl exive in structure . . . and 
is acquired, through practice, until it becomes second nature.”51 She says that 
the virtuous hearer must train themselves, though dialogue and experience, to 
have a generous (we might say charitable) disposition toward the knower, and to 
adjust our credibility upward to correct for hermeneutical marginalization. That 
the NCCB ad hoc committee appeared to listen generously and with epistemic 
humility in accepting the accounts that women gave of their lived experience 
during the period lasting through the writing of the fi rst draft of the pastoral 
letter on women proves that it could and should have been done at that time 
and can and must be done now. 
It is diffi cult enough for us to become virtuous hearers as individuals—for 
institutions, it will be even harder. A commonsense fi rst step (which the NCCB 
took when gathering information for and writing the fi rst draft) would be that 
members of the marginalized group (women) be invited to be among the hear-
ers (Church hierarchy). During Pope Francis’s papacy, there has been renewed 
talk regarding women in leadership roles including, perhaps, as cardinals (who, 
at times in Church history, didn’t necessarily need to be ordained).52 But even 
without women as cardinals, if women are admitted to the top roles that laity 
can occupy and also invited to be “cultural” advisors to the pope and magiste-
rium, a more open attitude would be likely. 
49 Ibid., 170. 
50 For this insight and for my introduction to Fricker, I am indebted to Melissa Shew for a 
summer 2012 doctoral philosophy seminar at Marquette University.
51 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 91.
52 See Luke Hanson, SJ, “Cardinal Marx on Francis, the Synod, Women in the Church, and 
Gay Relationships,” America, January 22, 2015, http://americamagazine.org/issue/cardinal-marx
-francis-synod-women; and Joshua J. McElwee, “Vatican Spokesman: Female Cardinals ‘Theoreti-
cally Possible,’” National Catholic Reporter, November 4, 2013, http://ncronline.org/blogs/ncr
-today/vatican-spokesperson-women-cardinals-theoretically-possible.
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Perhaps one of the most palatable ways for the hierarchy to approach vir-
tuous hearing might come through the broadening of an ecclesial process of 
“reception,” a historical, theological concept described by Richard Gaillardetz 
and others that lies fully within Church tradition.53 Reception has usually 
referred to the laity’s acceptance or rejection of the teachings of the bishops. 
But Gaillardetz imagines a more dialogical process. This doesn’t negate the 
teaching role of the bishops—in fact, good teachers change both how and what 
they teach in response to new discoveries, the experiences of students they are 
teaching, and the signs of the times. Good teachers listen to and learn from their 
students. Good teachers also admit mistakes. The bishops themselves alluded 
to this in the closing section of fi rst draft of the letter, writing, “thus, having 
heard the word, we must respond with imagination and courage to eradicate 
the injustice which keeps us from the full stature of Christ.” 54 Farley agrees that 
the Church should return to the practice of hearing the faithful and teaching 
through reception.55 But, in practicing reception, she urges all in the Church to 
pray for what she calls an underused gift of the Holy Spirit, the grace of self-
doubt. To begin a process of hearing virtuously, Church teaching offi ces, using 
that grace of self-doubt, must:
admit past mistakes, refuse to collapse the teaching role of bishops into 
the teaching role of the papacy, consult widely on moral matters, rec-
ognize that discernment is a process, revise procedures for overseeing 
theological work, and overall, introduce a more communal form of dis-
cernment in the Church. . . . The grace of self-doubt is what allows for 
epistemic humility, the basic condition for communal as well as indi-
vidual moral discernment. . . . It is unlikely that offi cial moral teachings 
can be received by members of the church whose experience of moral 
obligation are dismissed or denied.56 
53 In “The Reception of Doctrine: New Perspectives” (in Authority in the Roman Catholic 
Church, ed. Bernard Hoose [Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2002], 95–114), Richard Gaillardetz describes 
what the practice might look like in today’s Church: “In the fi rst moment, we begin not with laws 
and doctrines, but with the lived experience and testimony of the Christian community.” He con-
tinues, “This suggests that the process of doctrinal teaching actually begins with the magisterium 
receiving the lived faith of the people prior to giving that faith any offi cial formulation in law, ritual, 
or doctrine” (7). It represents a dialogue among the community of the faithful. He points out the 
benefi t of reception to marginalized groups: “The stance of those in Christianity who either ‘live in 
exile’ or at least ‘in the margins,’ for example, those women who feel oppressed and excluded by the 
tradition—must also be given voice in the process for doctrinal reception” (4).
54 NCCB, Partners in the Mystery of Redemption. 
55 Farley describes the practice of hearing the faithful and teaching through the process of 
reception, wherein moral insights of the Church must be “informed, critiqued, nurtured, chas-
tened, but fi nally freed for communal and individual moral action” (“Ethics, Ecclesiology, and the 
Grace of Self-Doubt,” 66). 
56 Ibid., 61, 68–69.
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Virtuous hearing must be a two-way street, and it is incumbent upon those in 
the marginalized groups to try to hear the members of the hierarchy virtuously, 
trying to adjust credibility, and to hear them in the most charitable and loving 
way, trying to give each his/her due (which is only just). However, it is incum-
bent upon the powerful to begin the process both immediately and honestly. 
I would encourage a conversation on virtuous hearing, which might include 
exploration of an adaptation of the ancient Church practice of doctrinal recep-
tion, practiced with the grace of self-doubt (or epistemic humility), as one way 
for Church leaders to hear the faithful virtuously. But, in whatever way the 
Church approaches virtuous hearing, the practice of trying to hear virtuously 
is one that might be successfully used by the hierarchy in dealing with groups 
other than women that feel marginalized within the Church. 
Finally, as to where to begin the enormous task of “hearing” the experience 
of the faithful, Fricker might point us back to Aristotle, who said that the train-
ing of a virtuous person occurred through habituation and practice: “But virtues 
we do acquire by fi rst exercising them, just as happens in the arts. Anything 
we learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it; people become builders by 
building and instrumentalists by playing instruments. Similarly, we become just 
by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate ones, brave by 
performing brave ones.”57 And, with the grace of God, we may become virtuous 
hearers through the practice of virtuous hearing. 
Mary Carlson is a clinical instructor in the College of Education’s 
Department of Educational Policy and Leadership at Marquette University. 
She supervises student teachers in the fi eld and teaches a number of classes, 
but the one closest to her heart centers on teaching children with exceptional 
needs. She is also a candidate in Marquette’s Interdisciplinary PhD program, 
with a focus in theology, philosophy, and special education. She completed 
her dissertation “Special Education as a Moral Mandate in Catholic Schools” 
in 2016. Her research interests center on justice for marginalized groups in 
schools, the Church, and society. mary.carlson@marquette.edu.
57 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 81
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